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Is the glass half-empty or half-full? Though this question is usually presented as an 
unanswerable dilemma, the right answer is easy, and simply depends on another 
question: what did the glass look like beforehand? On that basis there can be no 
question that our Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms1 glass is half-full: 
individual rights are much better protected now than they were in 1982.
More than that, there is a sense in which the glass cannot be emptied out. By 
this stage in Charter analysis, certain shared presumptions have been worked deeply 
into the approach. Although there is still plenty of room for debate about whether 
particular laws or practices do or do not “cross the line”, that debate is now premised 
on shared expectations about how we go about drawing the line in the first place. 
Individual decisions might be in doubt, but the range from which acceptable answers 
can be chosen is rarely in dispute.
What I hope to show in this short paper is the way in which the Charter has, in 
its first 20 years, had much of its most dramatic and long-lasting effect by creating 
a largely unconscious consensus about how Charter disputes are to be settled. In a 
number of important decisions between 1984 and 1986, the Supreme Court of 
Canada laid down ground rules for how Charter rights were to be interpreted and 
how Charter issues were to be analysed. In most of these cases the results were not 
easily predicted in advance, but are now so ingrained in us that it can be difficult to 
recognize that the decision could have gone the other way, or indeed to remember 
that a decision was involved. The result has been to remove from debate an
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enormous potential range of issues. My intention here is to show how different 
Charter interpretation could have been today if any of those decisions had been 
made differently.
In pursuing this goal, I will undertake two steps. The first will be to describe 
what I see as the early cases most influential in setting this unconscious consensus. 
Secondly, I will consider three quite recent decisions, noting the approach to analysis 
taken and the issues not present. We are less likely to notice absences, but they can 
be enormously significant nonetheless. In essence, the early Charter cases set the 
terms within which later disputes must be settled, and apart from any other 
considerations they are extremely important for those structural reasons alone.
Early Structural Charter Decisions
In this section, I will discuss seven cases. They are not necessarily the most 
influential or most important, though good arguments could be made to place each 
of them on such a list. Rather, these seven cases are included because they are the 
ones most affecting the way in which Charter analysis is done today - partly by 
laying down the actual rules, partly by rejecting suggested rules. It is that structural 
effect on today’s Charter analysis that I am most interested in describing. In 
particular, each is a case where the Court was presented with a choice between a 
broad or a restricted approach to Charter interpretation, and in each case the Court 
opted for the broader approach.
The first case on the list is Hunter v. Southam.2 It concerned s. 8 of the Charter, 
and its basic rule “a warrantless search is prima facie unreasonable” has had a major 
impact on all subsequent search and seizure caselaw. More important, however, is 
the fact that in Hunter the Supreme Court clearly articulated that Charter rights had 
to be interpreted in a broad and purposive manner. Prior to Hunter, it could plausibly 
be argued that “the Charter does not intend a transformation of our legal system or 
the paralysis of law enforcement.”3 Following Hunter, there could be no real 
question that transformation was exactly what the Charter would effect. A 
constitution, the Court noted:
2 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 [Hunter].
3 R. v. Altseimer (1982), 29 C.R. (3d) 276 at 282 (Ont.C.A.), quoted in Don Stuart, Charter Justice in 
Canadian Criminal Law, 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Thomson Canada Ltd, 2001) at 3.
is drafted with an eye to the future. Its function is to provide a continuing 
framework for the legitimate exercise of governmental power and, when joined by 
a Bill or a Charter of Rights, for the unremitting protection of individual rights and 
liberties. Once enacted, its provisions cannot easily be repealed or amended. It 
must, therefore, be capable of growth and development over time to meet new 
social, political and historical realities often unimagined by its framers.4
This approach to Charter interpretation is Hunter's real legacy. Indeed ironically 
the actual issue in Hunter, or searches in a regulatory context, is one of those about 
which there has been a certain ebb and flow in case law, and it is entirely possible 
that given later developments the bottom line result on those same facts today might 
be different.5 But what seems now so ingrained into constitutional interpretation that 
it cannot be abandoned is the attitude of mind from Hunter, that the rights in the 
Charter are to be interpreted broadly, are to be given meaning according to the 
interests they are intended to protect, and are capable of upsetting years of prior 
practice.
A special instance of that approach, but one worth noting separately, is found in 
R. v. Therens.6 It is the first right to counsel case, but once again its major 
significance does not relate to its findings on that specific right. Rather, it is the 
relationship between pre- and post -Charter case law that is of most significance. In 
Therens, the accused was stopped for a roadside screening test and was not informed 
of the right to counsel. The question was whether he had been under “detention” 
within the meaning of s. 10(b) of the Charter. What makes the case significant is 
that the same issue had come before the Court under the Canadian Bill o f  Rights,7 
and the conclusion had been reached that a person stopped for a roadside screening 
was not detained in the necessary sense. The Crown argued that in framing s. 10(b) 
of the Charter Parliament must have known the limits that had been put on the rights 
as phrased in the Bill o f Rights: in adopting essentially the same wording Parliament 
must therefore have intended those same limits to apply to Charter rights. This was 
an entirely plausible argument which had persuaded four courts of appeal,8 but the
4 Hunter, supra note 2 at 155.
5 See the Court’s later decision in R. v. McKinlay Transport Ltd., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627, for example.
6 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613.
7 Canadian Bill o f  Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. Ill [Bill o f  Rights}.
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Supreme Court of Canada rejected it. They held in Therens that:
the premise that the framers of the Charter must be presumed to have intended that 
the words used by it should be given the meaning which had been given to them by 
judicial decisions at the time the Charter was enacted is not a reliable guide to its 
interpretation and application.9
What was rejected here was not simply a particular approach to the interpretations 
of rights which are found in both the Charter and the Bill o f Rights. Rather, Therens 
amounts to a broad scale rejection of the argument that rights were already 
sufficiently respected in Canada. It is as though an argument were made under s. 1 
that a measure was demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society on the 
basis that it was a measure adopted in Canada and Canada is a free and democratic 
society. Put on that basis, the circularity of the argument is obvious and it is clear 
that it would render meaningless most of the Charter’s guarantees. It is worth 
reminding ourselves that the rejection of that possibility was not inevitable.10
Mentioning s. 1 leads to the next case on the list, R. v. Oakes.11 The case is best 
known for the test used in deciding whether a law is justified under s. 1 : a test that 
still bears its name, though the analysis has evolved since then. The major issues in 
the case were the constitutionality of a reverse onus provision in the Narcotic 
Control Act12 and the Court’s interpretation o f the Charter guarantee of the 
presumption of innocence in s. 11 (d).13 The case is here, however, not for either of 
these issues, but for a different point about s. 1 analysis: onus of proof. With 
essentially no discussion, the Court concluded:
9 Therens, supra note 6 at 638.
10 Indeed, essentially that approach was taken to the Bill o f  Rights. In R. v. Robertson, [1963] S.C.R. 
651 at 654, the Court held that:
the Canadian Bill o f  Rights is not concerned with “human rights and fundamental freedoms” 
in any abstract sense, but rather with such “rights and freedoms” as they existed in Canada 
immediately before the statute was enacted.
11 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
12 Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-l.
13 In which finding, it might be noted, it specifically rejected the argument which had prevailed in 
interpreting the similar guarantee in the Bill o f  Rights: see R. v. Appleby, [1972] S.C.R. 303.
The onus of proving that a limit on a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter is 
reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society rests upon the 
party seeking to uphold the limitation. It is clear from the text of s. 1 that limits on 
the rights and freedoms enumerated in the Charter are exceptions to their general 
guarantee. The presumption is that the rights and freedoms are guaranteed unless the 
party invoking s. 1 can bring itself within the exceptional criteria which justify their 
being limited.14
It needs little elaboration to demonstrate that onus of proof can be a significant 
factor in any judicial decision, Charter analysis or otherwise. In this case, it is most 
significant in dealing with rights that have no built-in limitations. Section 8, for 
example, is only a guarantee against “unreasonable” search and seizure, but many 
rights have no such internal limits. Fundamental freedoms in s. 2, democratic rights 
in ss. 3-5, mobility rights in s. 6, and some legal rights, such as the right to counsel 
in s. 10(b), are limited only by s. 1. As has frequently been noted, this contrasts with 
the approach in the United States, where no explicit equivalent to s. 1 exists, so the 
courts have been required to interpret rights in a limited fashion from the start.
This is not simply a question of whether a provision like s. 1 exists, however. 
Even given the provision’s existence it was open to the Court to read s. 1 as 
inherently a part of each individual right. We accept today without second thought 
that Charter analysis is a two-step process: is there a breach? If so is it justified? 
That did not have to be so.
Freedom of expression provides a clear example of how significant this 
difference can be. In the United States, not all expression is equally guaranteed. For 
example, the United States Supreme Court has developed tests which afford 
commercial speech less protection than other forms of speech.15 More generally, to 
fall under the First Amendment an applicant must show that his or her form of 
speech is of a type that should be protected, and must show what level of protection 
should be granted. This contrasts starkly to the approach taken in Canada, where the 
Court has concluded that anything intended to convey meaning is expression - even 
things like, if done in protest, parking a car. Thus in Ford the Court concluded that:
14 Oakes, supra note 11 at 136-137.
15 See the discussion of this issue in Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 [Ford\.
The issue in the appeal is not whether the guarantee o f freedom o f expression in s.
2(b) o f  the Canadian Charter and s. 3 o f the Quebec Charter should be construed 
as extending to particular categories o f  expression, giving rise to difficult 
definitional problems, but whether there is any reason why the guarantee should not 
extend to a particular kind o f expression...(emphasis added).16
Given this approach, there is clearly a great potential difference in the ultimate 
amount of protection for expression and many other rights. It would generally be 
more difficult for an applicant to show that his or her Charter rights were violated 
if that task also included showing that limits on those rights were not justified. These 
difficulties would be both practical (it might take considerable resources to lead the 
kind of evidence needed) and theoretical (the applicant would have to correctly 
anticipate all bases upon which the government or a court might decide that a limit 
is justified). Further, given that the onus is on the applicant to prove the Charter 
breach in the first place,17 onus of proof itself might settle the dispute. There would 
be a greater chance in individual cases that in the end no Charter violation would be 
found if the applicant had to show that a limit was not justified, than if the Crown 
had to show that it was.
Number four on the list is R. v. Big MDrug Mart Ltd.18 This case is included 
here not for its findings about freedom of religion or Sunday closing laws, but 
because it first laid down the rule that laws could violate the Charter not only 
because of their purpose but also because of their effect. In pre-Charter division of 
powers analysis, the key question was the purpose of the legislation in question: a 
valid purpose would generally save a law, even if that law had effects, sometimes 
quite significant effects, on matters not directly within the jurisdiction of the level 
of government in question. Thus a provincial law imposing a particular tax rate on 
banks was upheld even though s. 91 of the Constitution Act 1867 gives the federal 
government authority over banking.19 Effects were primarily relevant to this analysis
16 Ibid. at para. 47.
17 The text of the Charter is not explicit on this point either, but the Court reached this conclusion in R. 
v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265
18 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [Big M].
19 See Bank o f  Toronto v. Lambe (1887), 12 App. Cas. 575.
only to the extent that they might indicate the actual purpose of legislation, and 
perhaps show that the purpose was something other than the stated one.20 Focusing 
on the purpose of legislation and giving only secondary attention to its actual effects 
was an approach that would have come quite naturally to the Court when it was first 
confronted with the Charter.
Nonetheless the Court decided in Big M  that “both purpose and effect are 
relevant in determining constitutionality; either an unconstitutional purpose or an 
unconstitutional effect can invalidate legislation.”21 This conclusion is so ingrained 
at this stage that it is almost difficult to recognize it as a choice which was made. 
And yet, where at one point it was clear that purpose was a much more important 
consideration, developments since Big M  have not only made effects equally 
important, they have actually tended toward eliminating the distinction entirely.
In the division of powers context, the Court has now come routinely to talk about 
both purpose and effect from the start as the single method of settling the pith and 
substance of legislation.22 In the human rights context, the Court has recently done 
a major overhaul on its approach, consciously eliminating the distinction between 
direct discrimination and adverse effect discrimination.23 A primary impetus for this 
change was the Court’s conclusion that the distinction is:
unrealistic: a modem employer with a discriminatory intention would rarely frame 
the rule in directly discriminatory terms when the same effect — or an even broader 
effect -  could be easily realized by couching it in neutral language.24
In other words the stated purpose of a policy might be notably different from its 
actual purpose. In really getting at the merits of a policy - or law - it is therefore 
necessary to look not merely at the purpose but also at the effects of the law.
20 See e.g. Re Upper Churchill Water Rights, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297.
21 Big M, supra note 18 at 331.
22 See/?, v. Morgentaler, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463 or Reference re Firearms Act (Can.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783 
[Firearms Reference].
23 See British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, [1999] 3 S.C.R.
3 [BCGSEU],
24 Ibid. at 19.
Restricting Charter review to testing whether the purpose of legislation was to 
violate a right, therefore, would have greatly reduced the potential impact of the 
Charter. Not having done so has been instrumental in expanding the scope of the 
Charter. Further, whether relying directly on Big M  s conclusion about purpose and 
effects or not, in deciding Morgentaler, the Firearms Reference and BCGSEU, the 
Court seems to demonstrate an attitude towards interpretation that has completely 
internalized the approach first clearly articulated in the Charter context in Big M.
The next case among the seven to be presented here is Re B.C. Motor Vehicle 
Act.25 Once again the Court was faced with a choice between two approaches to 
interpretation and opted for the broad approach. This case differs from the previous 
in two notable ways. First, it is slightly narrower than the previous decisions 
because it is more closely focused around a particular right, s. 7. Second, there is a 
strong argument that the approach taken by the Court was not simply unexpected, 
but was specifically against the intention of the drafters. This is of course one of the 
central points in the decision, and the Court runs through at some length the evidence 
suggesting that “the principles of fundamental justice” were only intended to include 
procedural rules. Nonetheless they are unmoved and extend the scope of s. 7 to 
substantive issues as well.
The Charter unambiguously provides some substantive guarantees: the right to 
vote, mobility rights, or the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment 
would have virtually no meaning if they did not have substantive content. It does 
not follow, however, that s. 7 was required to have substantive content. It is 
particularly significant that it does, however, given the “over-arching” nature of the 
right. Even if one does not view s. 7 as Justice Lamer (as he then was) describes it 
in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, as a general guarantee of which ss. 8-14 are specific 
instances, it is still among the legal rights the one with the broadest potential scope. 
To allow courts to decide that Parliament and legislatures are simply not allowed to 
bring about some specific results, no matter what procedures are used to get there, 
opens the grounds of judicial review quite dramatically.
The five cases listed so far are all circumstances where the Court has had a 
choice between a broad and a narrow approach to interpretation and has adopted the
broader approach. Operation Dismantle v. The Queen26 is similar, but involves the 
Court adopting a broad approach to the scope of issues capable of being reviewed, 
rather than to the method of that review. The actual challenge in the case - a claim 
that the government’s decision to allow cruise missile testing by the United States „ 
in Canada violated s. 7 of the Charter - was not successful. Far more significant, 
however, was the fact that the Court agreed the challenge could be brought at all.
The Crown argued that certain matters fell within the prerogative power of 
Parliament, rather than being powers derived from statute, and accordingly were not 
subject to review under the Charter. Justice Wilson, writing for herself but with the 
concurrence of the rest of the Court on this point, analysed the issue in the terms of 
the “political questions” doctrine in the United States: “It is a well established 
principle of American constitutional law that there are certain kinds of ‘political 
questions’ that a court ought to refuse to decide.”27 In Canada, she held, the same 
should not be true. Although courts ought not simply to substitute their own opinions 
on policy matters for those of Parliament, a court cannot “relinquish its jurisdiction 
either on the basis that the issue is inherently non-justiciable or that it raises a 
so-called ‘political question’.”28
The effect of this conclusion is obvious, though easily overlooked today. First, 
as Justice Wilson notes, there has been inconsistency in the application of the 
doctrine in the United States, and dispute over its proper scope: rejecting the doctrine 
spares us that level of confusion. More significantly, the decision removes from the 
Crown the argument that particular issues are non-reviewable, and therefore opens 
to Charter scrutiny an expanse of government decision-making that could have 
remained untouched. Today, precisely because it has become a non-issue, it is easy 
not to notice the number of cases that might not have been before the courts in the 
first place had Operation Dismantle been decided differently.
Finally, the last case on the list is Singh v. Minister o f Employment and
26 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 [Operation Dismantle].
27 Ibid. at 467.
28 Ibid. at 472.
Immigration.29 Like Operation Dismantle this case is slightly more restricted in its 
scope of application: it not only is specific to s. 7, it is primarily of significance to 
questions of immigration and deportation, and other situations where a person might 
be subject to particular treatment in another country. Nonetheless it is worth 
including on the list because its effect was to allow s. 7 claims to be asserted in many 
situations where they might simply have been unavailable.
Singh was appealing a refusal of a decision, both by the Minister of Employment 
and Immigration and the Immigration Appeal Board, to grant him refugee status.30 
The basis of his claim was that he would face threats to his life, liberty and security 
of the person if he were returned to India. It is tempting to think about the case as 
having decided that Singh was entitled to assert a s. 7 claim on the basis that 
“everyone” in s. 7 includes everyone present in Canada, including non-Canadians, 
and certainly that is one conclusion reached in the case. However, although 
important, that finding was not disputed by the Crown.
The more central issue was whether a violation of s. 7 could be found based on 
actions of another government at a future time. The Crown relied on a previous 
lower court finding that:
If  the applicant is deprived o f any o f  those rights after his return to his own country, 
that will be as a result o f the acts o f the authorities or o f other persons o f that 
country, not as a direct result o f the decision o f the Board. In our view, the 
deprivation o f  rights referred to in section 7 refers to a deprivation o f rights by 
Canadian authorities applying Canadian laws.31
Singh rejects that approach to s. 7. Disapproving of the approach taken under the 
Bill o f Rights, and casting a passing aspersion on the political question doctrine, the 
Court reads s. 7 broadly in several ways. First, it finds that life, liberty and security
29 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 [Singh].
30 The case actually involved seven claimants with various factual differences concerning where they 
had first asserted their claim and so on, but the Court held that these differences were not significant to 
the Charter analysis.
31 Singh v. Minister o f  Employment and Immigration, [1983] 2 F.C. 347 349, cited in Singh, supra note
29 at 203.
of the person are separate interests, any one of which can be the foundation for a 
claim. Further, the Court finds that a mere threat to one of those interests is sufficient 
to bring s. 7 into play. Finally, the Court concludes that where the actions of the 
Canadian government can lead to a person being sent to a country where he or she 
faces such a threat, the actions of the Canadian government itself implicate the 
interests protected by s. 7, and therefore must accord with the principles of 
fundamental justice. This has obvious impacts on issues such as immigration,32 but 
the reading of s. 7 interests as being separate interests, each invoked only by a threat, 
also gives the section much greater scope of application.
In each of the seven cases above, a realistic choice about the general approach 
to the Charter or how to interpret specific rights in the Charter was presented to the 
Court. In each case the Court opted for the approach which allowed Charter review 
in more instances, and maximized the scope of that Charter review. Although the 
Court did not adopt this broader approach in every single instance in which such 
choice was available,33 it is fair to say that the broader approach characterized the 
early Charter decisions.
Nothing is ever constant, of course, and the Court’s approach to individual 
Charter rights has ebbed and flowed over the subsequent years. Askov14 gave real 
content and significant effect to the right to a trial within a reasonable time, but the 
Court changed its analysis of that right in Morin‘S to leave it of little real 
consequence. In Smith36 the Court adopted an analytical approach depending on 
hypothetical cases to deciding whether a punishment was cruel and unusual, but 
largely backed away from that decision in Morrisey?1 Having set a Charter
321 understand that the Federal Department of Justice was required to hire a significant number of new 
lawyers specifically to deal with immigration cases in the wake of Singh - in effect, that the decision 
created a new field of practice for that Department.
33 In first interpreting the s. 2(d) right to freedom of association, for example, the Court took an approach 
which left the right virtually without content: see Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act 
(Alberta), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 [Alberta Reference].
34 R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199.
iSR. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771.
HR. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045.
minimum standard for access to complainant records in 0  ’Connor,38 the Court in 
Mills39 described that test as a mere common law one which Parliament could depart 
from if it chose. Morales40 struck down the public interest criterion regarding bail 
as too vague, but Hall41 quite recently found an extremely similar provision to be 
acceptable. Thus, some individual advances in Charter protection are later lost.42
What I will pursue in the second half of this discussion, however, is my earlier 
claim that although the protection of particular individual rights might wax and 
wane, the kind of basic framework decisions made in the seven cases discussed 
above operate at so fundamental a level that they are virtually immune from being 
revisited. Those decisions create the structure within which we now analyse whether 
particular Charter claims are meritorious or not, and operate at a nearly 
“subconscious” level in the analysis. Although parties might dispute whether a law 
is or isn’t justified, they don’t dispute that the onus of justification is on the Crown. 
Although the Crown might claim that a Minister’s decision deserves deference, they 
do not argue that the decision is not open to review at all. Appellant and Crown 
might disagree over what purpose a law ought to try to achieve, but don’t dispute 
that purposive analysis is the approach to take. Those types of decisions are simply 
part of the way things are done. As a result, no matter how the debate ebbs and 
flows, some gains almost cannot be lost.
Recent Illustrative Charter Decisions
This section of the paper will attempt to show the current significance of the cases
38 R. v. O'Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411.
39 R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668.
40 R. v. Morales, [ 1992] 3 S.C.R. 711.
41 R. v. Hall, 2002 SCC 64.
42 Although the general tendency recently has been to narrower readings of Charter rights, that is not 
a perfectly consistent trend. Dunmorev. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016,forexample, 
suggested that there might yet be some role that freedom of association could play despite the effective 
gutting of that right in the Alberta Reference, supra note 33, while United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 
S.C.R. 283 offered stronger protection under s. 7 against extradition to face the death penalty than had 
Kindler v. Canada (Minister o f  Justice), [1991 ] 2 S.C.R. 779, a decade earlier.
mentioned above. Where all of those cases were from the first two years of Supreme 
Court C/wrter jurisprudence, the cases here will be drawn from the last two years. 
They do not of course “prove” that the cases above are the most significant: it would 
be naive to think that in general such a proposition could be proven by a few 
examples. By its nature my claim is not easily proven in any ordinary sense. One 
might, of course, point to the number of Bill o f Rights decisions which were not 
followed43 in order to show the significance of Therens. However, to do so would 
miss the broader point that it is the difference in basic approach between Bill o f 
Rights decisions and Charter decisions which has had the most significant impact. 
My argument would not be proven by a broad-ranging analysis of, for example, the 
number of later decisions in which the early cases mentioned above are relied on. 
A large part of my point is that these early cases have removed issues from 
consideration: they do not need to be relied on because the arguments to which they 
would relate simply do not occur. The cases which follow, therefore, should be 
considered illustrative only.
Three cases will be discussed, for three slightly different reasons. Suresh v. 
Canada (Minister o f Citizenship and Immigration)44 will show the many different 
ways in which Charter arguments might have been pursued today had the early cases 
been decided differently. Many issues do not arise, or alternatively are permitted to 
arise, in the Court’s reasoning in that case because of the cases above. Sierra Club 
ofCanada v. Canada (Minister o f Finance)45 will show how early Charter decisions 
have affected the Court’s approach to a wide range of issues: in particular, that even 
the results in non -Charter cases are now frequently affected by Charter-based 
considerations. Finally, Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer)46 will show how 
the basic structural decisions about how to reason under the Charter can be the 
deciding factor in a case, independent of the actual issue. Sauvé will also show, 
however, that despite the fundamental gains in protection for individual rights 
gained in the early decisions, it is never safe to be complacent.
43 For example R. v. Robertson, supra note 10 on Sunday closing laws or R. v. Appleby, supra note 13 
on the presumption of innocence.
44 [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 [Suresh].
45 2002 SCC 41 [Sierra Club o f  Canada].
46 2002 SCC 68 [Sauvé].
Suresh is widely regarded as a decision of some importance in immigration 
jurisprudence. The appellant was a convention refugee who applied for landed 
immigrant status, but who faced deportation proceedings. The Minister of 
Immigration, based on information she received from an immigration officer, first 
gave notice to the accused that she might, then actually did, issue an opinion that he 
might be a danger to the security of Canada. He was ordered deported to Sri Lanka. 
The Minister’s opinion was based on information suggesting that Suresh was a 
member of the Tamil Tigers, a group alleged to be engaged in terrorist activities in 
Sri Lanka. Members of the Tamil Tigers were subject to torture in Sri Lanka.
The Supreme Court ordered that Suresh should receive a new deportation 
hearing, in large measure because appropriate procedural protections were not in 
place. In particular, although Suresh had notice of the issue the Minister was 
considering and was able to make his own submissions, he did not have copies of the 
material provided to her by the immigration officer and was not able to respond to 
it.
The decision was not an unalloyed victory for Suresh nor for those seeking 
greater limits on deportation. The Minister’s decision itself was not said to be 
unreasonable, and the Court affirmed that deference should be given in future cases 
to decisions by a Minister as to whether a particular refugee’s presence constitutes 
a danger to Canada, or whether the refugee faces a substantial risk of torture if 
deported. Nonetheless, it had a noteworthy impact on the way in which the 
deportation process is conducted. Much of that impact, and the way in which the 
decision was made, can be traced to the cases outlined above.
For example, although Suresh’s ultimate remedy was a procedural one - a new 
hearing with notice of the case to meet -  the central s. 7 issue was a substantive one. 
Lower courts had found that possible deportation to face torture did not violate the 
principles of fundamental justice: the Supreme Court of Canada found that it did. 
The central point to note is not which level of court is correct, nor why the Supreme 
Court reached the conclusion it did, but that the issue would not have been before 
the Court at all had it not been for the approach taken in Re B. C. Motor Vehicle Act. 
The issue was not whether torture would violate Suresh’s life, liberty or security of 
the person; it was whether deportation to face torture was a substantive violation of 
the principles of fundamental justice.
Similarly, had it not been for Singh, the case would likely never have occurred. 
The Court explicitly notes that refugee claimants fall among “everyone” in s. 7. 
More significantly, if the findings of lower courts in Singh that subsequent actions 
of foreign governments could not be the foundation of a s. 7 claim had prevailed in 
the Supreme Court, Suresh would have had no plausible s. 7 claim from the start.
Further, the focus of the case was a decision by the Minister of Immigration, a 
decision based on whether Suresh was a threat to Canada. The Court observes that 
this is a political question,47 and one of the important issues in the case is the 
appropriate standard of review of the decision. Had Operation Dismantle been 
decided differently, however, the issue would not simply have been the standard 
against which to review the Minister’s decision: there would have been the prior 
question of whether the decision was reviewable at all. Indeed, had Operation 
Dismantle opted to create a political questions doctrine, the applicability of the 
doctrine might not have been in dispute in this case, because the case might never 
plausibly have been brought.
Note as well that it was open to the Minister to seek assurances that Suresh 
would not be tortured if he was returned to Sri Lanka. If intent to violate rights were 
the only issue, or even the most important issue, seeking such an assurance would 
be virtually determinative of the case. In fact, however, because the effect of the 
Minister’s action is equally important, the Court indicates the need to weigh in the 
balance not just whether such assurances are sought or given, but whether such 
assurances are of any value. Torture is an illegal process, and the Court says there 
should not be heavy reliance on assurances from states which have a past record of 
allowing torture. Further, they note, torture can result because of the inability of a 
state to control the behaviour of its officials.48 Though the Court does not put it in 
this context, much of this discussion is relevant only because of the conclusion in 
Big M  concerning Charter violations through effects.
It should also be noted that the case is very much one of balancing competing 
interests and deciding how to weigh a risk of torture, assurances that it will not 
occur, the inability of a foreign government to fulfil such a promise, threats to the
47 Suresh, supra note 44 at para. 85.
48 See ibid. at paras. 123-125.
security of Canada, obligations under international agreements, and so on. It seems 
likely, therefore, that the initial onus being on the accused to show a Charter breach 
followed by the Crown having the onus of justification under s. 1 could be relevant. 
This consideration is of course less prevalent in s. 7 cases, which already involve 
considerable balancing at the initial stage. Still, when the final question the Court 
asks is whether the government can “justify the failure of the Minister to provide fair 
procedures where this exception involves a risk of torture”,49 it is difficult to believe 
that onus of proof as set out in Oakes has not played some part.50
The second recent case, Sierra Club o f Canada, is particularly interesting 
because it is not a Charter case at all. The actual issue was whether under Rule 151 
of the Federal Court Rules51 a crown corporation, in this case Atomic Energy of 
Canada Ltd., could obtain a confidentiality order with regard to documents that it 
was required to file with the Court. Under the order sought the public would be 
allowed access to the trial and the documents would be made available to the parties, 
but no copies of the documents would be otherwise available. Ultimately the Court 
laid down a test for deciding in general when such confidentiality orders should be 
available, and granted the order in this case.
The Court’s approach to deciding this question - a question which involved no 
Charter claim - was to rely quite directly on consideration arising from Charter 
issues and tests laid down in Charter cases. Primarily, the Court considers the 
importance of free expression, and the value implied thereby of free access to 
information by the public generally. Further, they rely on the importance of the right 
to a fair trial: a Charter right they acknowledge is not actually invoked by the
49 Ibid. at para. 128.
50 There is one further indication of the importance of the cases I mention, though I present it with some 
hesitation, because it threatens to make the argument broad enough that it might appear incapable of 
being disproved. Still, it is noteworthy that in interpreting the concept of “danger to the security of 
Canada” in deportation legislation, the Court indicates that it must adopt a “fair, large and liberal 
interpretation” of the phrase (ibid. at para. 85). On the face of it this shows the language of Hunter and 
of purposive interpretation. In effect, of course, it moves in the opposite direction, since Hunter wanted 
a broad interpretation of rights and Suresh's approach would constitute a broad interpretation of limits 
on rights. Still, it does demonstrate that the terminology within which debate must take place has been 
partly settled by Hunter.
51 Federal Court Rules, 1998, r. 51.
proceedings, but which they see as having guiding effect nonetheless. Finally, they 
stress the importance of open courts and public and media access to their 
proceedings, as an aspect of the s. 2(b) right.
Unlike Suresh, little explicit reference can be made to points in the reasoning in 
Sierra Club o f Canada which would have been different but for the cases listed 
above. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the interpretation even in the Charter 
context of all of the rights relied on in Sierra Club o f Canada owes a great deal to 
the broad interpretive approach laid down in Hunter, Therens, and Big M. First, that 
free expression received the very wide meaning it has been given, rather than a 
narrow one where protection for particular forms of expression needs to be justified, 
was noted above as one of the instances of the approach to onus adopted in Oakes. 
Further, note that the latter two principles relied on in Sierra Club o f Canada are not 
explicitly found in the Charter, they have been taken to be implied by s. 7 and s. 
2(b) respectively. That the Charter should contain implied rights at all is an 
indication of its vigour: that those implied rights should be given controlling 
influence in private disputes where the Charter is not directly in issue stresses that 
point further still.
The influence of Charter cases can also be seen in the actual test laid down by 
the Court for granting confidentiality orders under the Federal Court rules. The test 
created mirrors quite closely and consciously the common law test for publication 
bans created in Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.51 Dagenais itself was a 
conscious adaptation of the balancing in the Oakes test into the particular context of 
common law publication bans. Quite directly, then, the provenance of the 
interpretation of the Federal Court Rules in a non -Charter context, both at the level 
of principle and at the “black letter” stage, can be traced to the approach to Charter 
interpretation laid down in the early cases.
The final case to consider here is Sauvé, which deals with inmate voting rights. 
The case certainly could serve as an example of the importance of the broad and 
purposive approach laid down in Hunter, or as one where the political questions 
doctrine could have arisen. However, it is presented here to show the significance 
of onus of proof at different stages as laid down in Oakes.
52 [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 [Dagenais].
Section 51(e) of the Canada Elections Act53 denies the right to vote to “every 
person who is imprisoned in a correctional institution serving a sentence of two years 
or more.” This section replaced an earlier provision which had denied the right to 
vote to all inmates in federal institutions, and which had been struck down for 
violating the right to vote guaranteed in s. 3 of the Charter.54 The new provision was 
also challenged as a violation of s. 3, and once again was struck down, by the narrow 
margin of five to four.
At a level of policy, the dispute about whether inmates should have the right to 
vote rests on the question of how one best promotes respect for democracy. On the 
one hand, it is possible to argue that those guilty of serious offences have shown an 
unwillingness to be bound by the rule of law. Accordingly, it is appropriate 
temporarily to remove those persons from the group establishing what law should 
rule. If one chooses to place oneself outside the system, the argument goes, then one 
must suffer the negative consequences of having done so. On the other hand, the 
counter-argument is that the concept of democracy does not depend on extending the 
right to vote to people who are sufficiently worthy to be entitled to it: rather, by its 
very nature democracy assumes everyone gets to take part. The power of lawmakers 
flows from their legitimacy as elected representatives, and removing the right to vote 
from inmates tends to undermine rather than enhance the claims to legitimacy of the 
system. Allowing participation in the system is the correct method, this argument 
goes, of promoting respect for it.
In the decision, the latter reasoning persuades five of the judges, and so the 
majority strikes down the law. The four dissenting judges would have upheld the 
law, for reasons relating to deference to Parliament in the area of “competing social 
or political philosophies.” They argue that both of the lines of argument outlined 
above share the common goal of promoting respect for democracy: the two 
approaches simply disagree about how best to achieve that goal. Further, the two 
theories rest on fundamentally unprovable assumptions. In such circumstances, the 
dissenters suggest, the Court should defer to Parliament’s view about which 
philosophy to adopt.
53 R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2, s. 51(e).
54 See Sauvé, supra note 46.
In addition, the dissenting judgment suggests, it is important to recognize that 
the s. 3 guarantee is subject to s. 1 and so it is a qualified, not an absolute right. The 
dissent’s reasoning on this point is a little obscure. It is of course true that no Charter 
right is an absolute right, because of the existence of s. 1. However, as noted earlier 
it is worth recognizing the different types of guarantees found in ss. 2 through 14: 
some, such as freedom of expression, have no internal limits, while others, such as 
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, are restricted before one ever 
reaches the justification stage at s. 1. It is clear the dissent would like to move as 
much as possible in the direction of reading limits into s. 3. They note the existence 
in an earlier draft of s. 3 of the phrase “without unreasonable distinction or 
limitation”, and quote Professor Hogg to the effect that “the reason for the deletion 
was, no doubt, that the words were redundant having regard to s. 1 .”55 Still, they are 
forced to acknowledge that justificatory concerns do not play a role in defining the 
content of s. 3, and that the right to vote is not one that “necessarily has inherent 
limitations within it.”56
This is a key point. Strictly in terms of content, of course, it is arguable that 
internal limits on a right are redundant if those same limits will arise at the s. 1 stage. 
But precisely the effect of the distribution of onus from Oakes is that although those 
limits might arise later, they are much less likely to do so. Sauvé itself is the ideal 
example of this fact.
The majority does not accept the view that deference to Parliament’s choice of 
social philosophy would be the right answer, or for that matter is even an answer to 
the right question. Parliament is not entitled to decide whether respect for democracy 
is better promoted through denying or guaranteeing the right to vote:
The Charter makes this decision for us by guaranteeing the right o f “every citizen”
to vote...short o f a constitutional amendment, lawmakers cannot change this.57
55 Ibid. at para. 85, quoting from Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law o f Canada, looseleaf (Scarborough: 
Carswell, 2001 ) vol. 2 at 42-2, fn. 12.
56 Ibid. at para. 86.
57 Ibid. at para. 37.
In other words, it is too late now to be picking among competing social philosophies. 
We did that already - it’s called the Charter.
This argument only succeeds, however, because the onus at the s. 1 stage rests 
with the government. Section 3 is, prima facie, an absolute right. It does not say, 
as it might have, that there is a right to vote without unreasonable restriction, a 
wording which based on Collins would require the applicant to show that the 
limitation was not reasonable. Rather, given the wording of s. 3 and Oakes, the 
Crown must show that the limit is reasonable. In situations where, as the dissent 
suggests here, the competing theories rest on inherently unprovable assumptions, 
that method of dividing responsibility settles the case.
Although Sauvé ultimately shows the significance of this point from Oakes, it 
is also appropriate to see it as sounding a note of caution. All nine judges accept the 
general approach that the government bears the burden of justification under s. 1. 
However, the dissenting decision, subscribed to by four of the nine judges, would 
in large measure have undone that approach if it had succeeded in creating what was 
effectively an exception to that rule in cases of “competing social or political 
philosophy.” If in general the Court ought to defer in its s. 1 analysis to the judgment 
of Parliament when a case concerns competing philosophies, we would find a sudden 
and dramatic increase in the number of issues of philosophy arising. In effect, it 
would amount to a version of the “political questions doctrine.” Questions resting 
on competing social and political philosophies would not be immune from review, 
but the onus regarding justification would effectively be reversed. Since virtually 
all law could plausibly be argued to be a matter of social and political philosophy, 
the argument would arise routinely. It would frequently succeed, leading to a 
diminution of Charter protection.
In this regard, it should not only be a source of concern that four of nine judges 
were willing to create such a rule. Of less concern, but a concern nonetheless, is that 
even the five judges in the majority frequently treat the decision as though it were 
a question of choosing the appropriate social and political philosophy. Really, to 
have said that the Charter had settled the point by attaching no internal limits 
(beyond citizenship) to the right to vote was a sufficient answer. In fact, though, the 
majority argues at some length that Parliament adopted the wrong social philosophy, 
and that the more inclusive philosophy was the correct one. To do this is to imply 
that it is worth doing this: that it somehow needed to be demonstrated that the denial
of the s. 3 right was not justified. That counsel for Sauvé would attempt to do this 
in the course of argument is of course understandable as a strategic consideration: 
for the Court to do so in its decision is unnecessary and misleading. To the extent 
that it implies that the issue is one of choosing the correct social philosophy, it risks 
creating the undesirable exception argued for by the dissent.
Conclusion
Pendulums always swing. It is inevitable that in interpreting rights, courts over the 
years will be more inclined to give expansive readings at some points and narrower 
readings at others. That process is already easily observable with Charter rights. 
However, the Charter pendulum swung first in the right direction. We are far better 
off to have had early broad decisions which were later confined, than to have had 
early restrictive decisions which courts later had to struggle to go beyond.
Indeed, the better way to frame the analogy is to say that the early cases fixed 
the point from which the pendulum would hang. Whatever oscillations happened 
after had to happen within the arc allowed by those decisions. Had early results 
created a different structure, the area within which Charter disputes could take place 
would be entirely different.
Today, parties dispute whether a result will or will not go too far in advancing 
a broad purposive approach to Charter rights, but do not dispute that a broad 
purposive approach is necessary. They dispute whether effects violate rights, 
whether particular laws violate substantive principles of fundamental justice, and 
whether the Crown can justify a limit on rights: they dispute the answers to those 
questions, but not that those are the questions to be asked.
On the other hand, parties do not argue that matters are immune from review 
because they are political questions, or because they have already been settled pre- 
Charter. Such arguments could have existed, and could have been significant, but 
are happily absent from our constitutional scene.
These types of issues about how to analyse Charter claims have enormous 
importance, simply by the way they establish the terms of debate and issues open for 
dispute. They shape the questions to be asked and the way we will go about asking
them. In doing so they limit the range o f potential answers, or make particular results 
more likely. The ultimate effect is to prevent the glass from being drained below a 
certain point, to fix the period of the pendulum so that it cannot swing too far, and 
to provide a certain minimum protection via the Charter that, despite almost any 
later variation in individual cases, virtually cannot be lost. That is the true legacy of 
those early Charter decisions.
